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STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TIIE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
VII. Partnership Realty in itp relation to the Statute of
.Frauds.
UPON the question when and how far pa,.tnership realty is to be
regaided as personalty, see Sugden on Vendors, 8th Am. ed., Perkins's notes 498-9, cur notis; 1 Amer. Lead. Cases, 5th ed., 592
(484); 1 Tudor's Leading Cases in Mercantile and Maritime Law,
Ist Am. ed., 525; Fox's Digest of Partnership Law, tit. "Real
Estate ;" Collyer on Partnership, Perkins's ed., §§ 133-157, and
notes. For a series of propositions on this point, see Bird v. 21forrison, 12 Wis. 152; also Bissett on Partner. (Am. ed. 1847) *56.
As to the bearing of the Statute of Frauds, see Story on Partner-"
ship, 5th ed., § 89, and note. In Agate v. Gignoux, 1 Robert. 278,
it was decided that a lease owned by a partnership, though in equity
it might be.personalty for jartnership purposes, must be transferred
in writing under the Statute of Frauds. In Black v. Black, 15
Geo. 445, it was said that equity does not transmute land held by a
partnership into personalty, but only treats it as such for the purpose of adjusting the rights of the parties between themselves and
in relation to the firm-creditors. As to strangers, the land was said
to be realty, and a contract concerning it to be within the Statute
"of Frauds. See Wheatly v. Calhoun, 12 Leigh 272, and Le
Fevre's Appeal, 69 Penn. St. 125, to the same effect. In Smith
v. Burnham, 3 Sumn. 458, a contract of partnership to buy and
*sell was said to be within the Statute of Frauds. See Thorn v.
VOL. XXIV.-41
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Thorn, 11 Iowa 147; Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 689; Henley v.
Brown, 1 Stew. 144; (lancy v. Craine, 2 Dev. Eq. 363. In
R
.. Jlr u h. A Mass. 426, the law-merchant as to partnership was
vtts
said not to extend to speculation in land, and that by the Statute
of Frauds no man is chargeable on.any contract concerning the
sale of lanl, but on some memorandum in writing, &c. In Ballard v. Bond, 32 Vt. 358, explaining and distinguishing Hodges v.
Green,.28 Vt. 360, the plaintiff and defendant bad agreed, by
parol, that the former should convey to the latter certain land,
and that if within a year the plaintiff could find a better purchaser, the defendant should convey to such purchaser the land
and should share the profit with the plaintiff; the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant, and found a better purchaser within the
year; the defendant refused to convey to the latter, and the Statute of Frauds was held a good defence.
In Kidd v. Carson, 33 Md. 37. the plaintiff conveyed land to the
defendant, who by parol -.greed to sell and credit the profit to a
subsisting indebtedness of the plaintiff's to him ; the Statute of
Frauds held to apply. In Henderson v. Hudson, 1 Munf.-510,
the plaintiff claimed to be a partner in a purchase of land made
by the defendant, but only proved parol acknowledgments subsequent to the alleged agreement of partnership ; the Statute of
Frauds was held to apply.
Partnership contracts in land are within the Statute of Frauds,
and must be evidenced by writing: Bird v. lorrison, 12 Wis.
152, where the point is fully treated; Benton v. Roberts, 4 La.
Ann. 216; Gant v. Gant, 6 Id. 678; Pecot Co. v. Arnzelin
Bros., 21 *Id. 667; Rowland v. Boozer, 10 Ala. 694. In Linscott v. Melntire, 15 Me. 203, one who had an interest in land
procured it to be conveyed to another, who verbally promised to
sell and pay over the proceeds of sale: Reld, that the Statute of
Frauds was no bar to an action for such proceeds. See Leslie v.
Rosson, 39 Miss. 368; Runnell v. Taintor, 4 Conn. 568; Trowbridge v. 11etherbee, 11 Allen 861. In Bruce v. Hastings,41 Vt.
380, an agreement was to sell a farm and divide the profits, and
the Statute of Frauds was held no bar to an action for a share of
the profits. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant took the title
in their own names, but had the deed made directly from the
original owners to the vendees. In Watkins v. Gilkerson, 10 Tex.
340, citing 5 Id. 512, a contract to procure land-certificates and
patents in consideration of part of the land, held not to be within
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the Statute of Frauds. See Miller v. Roberts,'18 Tex. 19. In
Price v. Sturgis, 44 Cal. 594, a promise by one who has received
a conveyance of land to pay so much out of the first proceeds
of sale is not within the Statute of Frauds, "being not for the
conveyance of land, but for the payment of a certain sum of
money upon the happening of a certain event." Besides the references given at the beginning of this paper, see, on the general
subject of partnership realty, Bispham on Equity, §5 511-13 ; Foster's Appeal (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania), 13 Amer. Law

Reg. N. S. 300, and note.
VIII. How far Contracts relating to the. Produce of Land are
within the Statute of Frauds.

"The sale of emblements," says Mr. Leake (Elements of the
Law of Contracts 133-4), "or the annual growing crops sown by
the tenant of land (see Co. Litt. 55 a, b; Williams Ex., 5th
ed., 1860), is not considered as a contract concerning an interest
in the land for the purpose of the statute: I Wins. Saund. 277 b,
ni. f). An agreement for the sale of a growing crop of potatoes
is not a contract for an interest in land within the 4th sect. of the
statute: -Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & 0. 829; Sainsbury v. ilfatthews, 4 M. & W. 343 ; so, a sale of growing crops of corn: Jones
v. Flint, 10 A. & E. 753; but these contracts are within the 17th
sect. of the statute, as being sales of goods : Evans v. Roberts; and
see Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & 0. 561. It has been held that a
contract for the sale of growing crops of hops was not merely a
sale of goods, but gave an interest in the land within the 4th sect.:
Waddington v. Bristow, 2 B. & C. 451 ; also, that a sale of a
growing crop of turnips was within the 4th sect. : Emnerson v.
Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38; but these cases it is said would now probably
be decided differently. See Evans v. Roberts; Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 501, 503 ; Jones v. Flint. A contract for the
sale of a growing crop of grass, being a natural and permanent
crop and not coming within the description of emblements, is
a contract for an interest in land within the statute and must be
in writing: Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East 602; Evans v. Roberts; Shelton v. Livius, 2 C. & J. 411 ; Carrington v. Roots, 2
'M. & W. 248. So, a contract for the sale of a growing crop of trees
or underwood: Scovell v. Boxall, 1 Y. & J. 396; Teal v. Auty,
2 B. & B. 99. A contract for the sale of crops of fruit growing
on fruit trees, was held to be a contract for the sale of an interest in
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land within tile Stamp Act: Rodwell v. Phillips: Where a contract
is made for the tenancy or possession of land, together with the growing crops left upon the land and the benefit of work, labor and
materials previously expended in tilling the land, though the crops
and tillages may be agreed to be paid for at a separate valuation,
they are considered as forming part of the land, ard the contract
must be in writing: Earl.Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 C. & M. 89;
and see May field v. WIadsley, 3 B. & 0. 357. A contract for the
sale of the produce of land to be taken as goods does not give any
interest in the land, though it is not severed from the land at the
time of the contract ; as a contract for the sale of potatoes then
being in the ground at so much per sack or so much per acre:
Parker v. Staniland, 11 East 362; WTarnick v. Bruce, 2 M. &
S. 205. A contract for the sale of timber at so much per foot,
being the produce of certain trees then growing when they should
be cut down, was held not to be a contract for the sale of the
growing trees, and, therefore, not to give any interest in the land:
Smith v. Surman. A contract for the right to feed cattle on certain land was held to be a contract for the agistment of cattle
and not to give an interest in the land: tTones v. Flint."
.ructus industriales,while growing, were held to be personal chat-.
tels in Brittain v. ilrcKay, 1 Ired. 265, discussing Crosby v. Wads.
worth and Evans v. Roberts. In JThipple v. Toot, 2 John. 418, it
was held that wheat or corn growing was a chattel and might be
taken in execution as such. Newcomb v. Rayner, reported in a note
to Whipple v. Toot, was as follows: A. raised a crop on B.'s ground
and sold it verbally to C., who brought trespass de bonis asp. against
B., who had cut and carried it away: held he could recover. In
Rentch v. Long, 27 Md. 97, a contract to deliver at a future period
corn at the time of the promise ungathered, held not to be within
the Statute of Frauds, labor being part of the contract : BEichelberger v. XMcCauley, 5 II. & J., cited. In Bricker v. Hughes, 4 Ind.
146, "growing crops raised annually by labor," were said to be
"the subject of sale as personal property even before their maturity," and that their sale did 1' not necessarily involve an interest
Sherry v. Picker, 10
in realty requiring a written agreement."
Ind. 376, following Bricker v. Hughes, holds growing crops raised
annually by labor to be personalty. See Gant v Gant, 6 La. Ann678. In Ross v. Welsh, 11 Gray 235, a contract for sale at a certain
price of growing cabbages not yet ready to be gathered, but which
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afterwards, when ready for gathering, are counted to the parties,
with an agreement that the purchaser may take them away at any
time, makes a sufficient sale and delivery of the whole number,
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds. In Bull v. Griswold, 19
Ill. 632, growing wheat was held to be personal property and the
subject of a parol sale. From the syllabus of Powell v. Ricl, 41
Ill. 466, we extract the following: "As between landlord and tenant, debtor and creditor and (under the statute of Illinois) executor and heir, growing crops are personalty; but as between a
wrongdoer and the owner of the soil, and between vendor and purchaser, they are real estate and pass by a conveyance, unless a
reservation is made in the writing. Until matured they cannot
be sold by the owner of the soil, unless the transfer is evidenced
by a mdmorandum in writing." In Marshallv. Ferguson, 23 Cal.
69, it is held that the sale of growing fructus industrialesannual is
not within the Statute of Frauds, and that on this point the English
and American authorities agreed: Green v. Armstrong and Smith
v. Bryan cited. In Frank v. Harrington,86 Barb. 415, it was
held that hops growing and maturing on the vine are chattels.
Etans v. .Roberts was said to lay down the doctrine that maturity
was not important, but that the test was whether or not labor and
expense had been bestowed. Bishop v. Bishop, 1 Kern. 123, distinguished, and the English cases considered.
In Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cowen 39, Crosby v. Wadsworth, and
Parkerv. Staniland, were regarded as inconsistent, and a contract
for the sale of a growing crop held not to be within the Statute of
Frauds ; it was also said that the owner of the crop might have
trespass q. e.fr. for an injury to it. In Baker v. Jordan, 3
Ohio 438, it was held that growing corn might be reserved by
parol from the operation of a deed in the common form for the
land whereon it grows ; that evidence to this effect did not contradict the deed. In Alcllvaine v. Harris,20 Mo. 458, however, a
deed was executed for land with growing wheat crop on it; a verbal
reservation of the latter was made, and a sale of it (the crop) was
afterwards made to the grantee of the land. The Statute of
Frauds was held to apply. In Bryant v. Crosby, 40 Me. 21, the
English cases were considered, and crops ready to be cut were held
not to be within the Statute of Frauds. The New York cases
were considered to go the entire length of treating growing crops
as chattels always. In Burns v. Webster, 6 Cal. 664, it was held
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that growing trees may be conveyed by deed, and are not chattels
so as to require a delivery to perfect the assignment.
In Penhallon v. Dwight, 7 Mass. 34, corn ripe and fit to be cut
held subject to execution as a chattel. See, however, as to the
point of maturity, (Craddoekv. Riddlesberger, 2 Dana 206. In
Bowman v. Cann, 8 Ind. 58, a parol agreement to sell and
deliver at sixty dollars per ton whatever broom corn should be
raised in 1853 on a certain twenty-five acres, held to be a sale of
goo(Y, and for that reason within the Statute of Frauds : Watts
v. .Frien.1 cited. In Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. I. 294, an agreement to raise three acres of potatoes and deliver them to the other
party at so much per bushel, held to be a contract for chattels.
See, upon the question of annual crops being personalty, Stan,balh v. 1eates, 2 Rawle 161 ; Alqers v. White, 1 Id. 356, and
the Bank of Pennsylvaniav. Wise, 3 Watts 406.
In Cutler v. Pope, 1 Shep. 379, it was held that a contract for
the sale of grass already grown and in a condition to be cut was
not within the Statute of Frauds : Crosby v. tVadsworth criticised; Parker v. Staniland approved. In The Bank v. Gary, 1
Barb. 544, growing trees, fruits and grass, being parcel of the
land, were lichl to be within the Statato of Frauds, and that
they could not be sold or conveyed by parol. The distinction was
made between yearly crops and those growing spontaneously Und
permanently. it being admitted that grass, e. g., might be severed by
a writing, and then, though still uncut, it would be a chattel. The
Bank v. Garj was the case of an execution issued on growing
grass as a chattel, with the parol consent of the defendant in the execution : held not good.
ro.by v. Wadsworth, Beans v. Roberts,
Jones v. Flint, and Teal v. Auty, were considered. See, however,
Craddock v. Riddlesberger, 2 Dana 206. Huff v MeCauley, 53
Pinna. St. 210, cting Crosby v. Iradswortli, and Yeakle v. Jacobs,
33 Penna. St. 376, holds sales of growing timber, not made with
a view to immediate severance, within the Statute of Frauds. A
contract for the sale of growing trees is within the statute : Mrz1e7l v. Burnett, 4 Jones Law Rep. In claflin v. 0aTenter, 4
Mete. 582 (see also Seovell v. Boxal), it was held that a contract
for the sale of standing wood or timber, to be cut and severed from
the freehold by the vendee, does not convey any interest in the
land. A contract for wood to be cut and paid for at so much per
cord is not within tbU Statute of Frauds: jIillmore v. Jowlett,
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48 N. Y. 569. In Smith '. Bryan, 5 "Md. 141, A. sold B. trees
growing on the land of the former at a specific price ; B. cut and
removed some and resold the remainder to A. : Held to be a sale
of goods, and that as to the portion resold delivery was perftected,
citing 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 271. In Warren v. Leland, 2 Barb.
.613, it was said that growing trees, except where there is a special
ownership in the trees apart from the land, belong to the realty,
and a contract concerning them is within the Statute of Frauds.
In Bilasse v. Reese, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 372, a sale of growing trees
in contemplation of their immediate separation, held not to be
within the Statute of Frauds, citing 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 271.
In this case no time for the removal of the -trees was fixed, but the
vendee marked a certain number and had begun cutting them. In
Stephenls v. Santee, 51 Barb. 545, A. agreed to cut ties from his
own land and deliver them to B. at so much per tie; B. furnished
the money as the work progressed, and the timber was to be his as
soon as cut. The ties were cut and hauled to the land of a third
person, and there verbally turnedover to B. as his property : Held,
that they could not be levied on as A.'s property, and that the
Statute of Frauds did not apply to such a contract. The rule was
declared to be that where work upon the subject-matter of the sale
is to be done for the vendee, the case is taken out of the statute.
Iii Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 85, an agreement by an owner of
land that another may cut down trees on the land, peel them, and
take the bark to his own use, held not to be within the Statute of
Frauds. In Hawell v. 11_iller, 35 Miss. 700, the sale of growing
trees with the right to enter and cut is within the Statute of F rauds.
In Kingsley v. ilolbrook, 45 N. 11. 318, the law in Massachusetts
and Maine, citing 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 271, said to be that sales
of growing trees are not within the statute, unless it is shown that
they (the trees) were left on the land to derive benefit from it, or
unless the vendee was to have a beneficial interest in the land. The
court, however, held the presumption to be the other way, and that
the trees were realty, if the vendee had the right at a future time,
whether definite or indefinite, to enter and take them. In Buck
v.rPickwell, 27 Vt. 158, an agreement to sell all the timber on certaih land to be taken off at the vendee's pleasure, held to be within
the Statute of Frauds: Smith v. Surnian, and Sale v. Seeley,
distinguished, and a number of cases considered. Growing trees
not nursery ones are not a subject of execution: Breese 221. In
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Fitch v. Burr, 38 Vt. 683, approving Buck v. Pickwell, it was
said that a contract foi the future growth of trees and the beneficial
use of the land for that purpose for a series of years, or during the
pleasure of the vendee, may perhaps be distinguished from an
ordinary purchase of stumpage by the foot or cord in contemplation
of an early removal or delivery as chattels. In Ellison v. Brigham,
88 Vt. 66, a contract by the defendant to cut down timber on certain land and deliver it to the plaintiff, who was to pay for it at so
much per cord, was held to be within the Statute of Frauds, and
the court, citing Smith v. Surman, considered the agreement as
one for the delivery of chattels and not for work and labor done.
In the arguments of counsel a great many cases will be found cited.
See Whitmarsh v. Walker, 1 Mete. 313. - In Erskine v. Plummer,
7 Greenl. 451, semble, that a sale of growing trees to be cut and
carried away is not within the Statute of Frauds; but otherwise, as
to such a sale, with an indefinite time to the purchaser to take
away the timber: the law of Connecticut said to hold even the
bricks, &c., of a house to be severed to be personalty. In White
v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375, a grant of a present estate in trees while
growing, held to be within the Statute of Frauds; but otherwise
as to a mere right, either definite or unlimited, as to, the time to
enter and cut with a title to the property when it becomes a chattel.
In Pattison's Appeal, 61 Penna. 296, a sale of growing timber to
be taken off at discretion, held to be within the Statute of Frauds.
In Caine v. 31eGuire, 13 B. Mon. 340, a sale of growing timber
with a view to immediate severance, held not to be within the statute: Greenl. Ev., § 271, approved. In Green v. Armstrong, 1
Denio 552, a contract for twenty-two growing trees, to be paid for
at 1s. 6d. per saw-log, to be cut and carried away any time within twenty years, was held to be within the Statute of Frauds.
In Bennett v. Scott, 18 Barb. 347, A. and B. agreed that the
former should cut wood on the land of the latter and should have
till the next winter to carry it away: the Statute of Frauds held
to apply. An existing right in a third person to cut and remove
trees is an encumbrance on land so as to give rise to a breach of a
covenant to convey free of encumbrance land wich regard to which
such a right exists: iSpurr v. Andrew, 6 Allen 420.
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